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6. Free Expression and Privacy Protection are Complimentary Values
On the question of the privacy and freedom of expression, this is clearly not a
zero-sum relationship. ThiS can be shown by the fact that there are many countries
today with little regard for personal privacy or freedom of expression. The success
of the US legal s>,stem is to preserve both interests, to safeguard free expression
and to protect individual privacy.
There are also a series of cases that make clear that I?rivacy and the First Amendment are complimentary interests. In MacIntyre v. OhIO, for example, the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that required the publisher of a handbill to place
her actual name on the pamphlet. In so doing, the Court recognized that the freedom to express ones views includes also the right to withheld ones identity. There
are many other examples in American law where we safeguard privacy to promote
free expression and freedom of association. It's worth noting, for example, that the
freedom to vote as one wishes in a democratic society is safeguarded by the privacy
of the voting booth.
There are tough cases where the First Amendment and privacy interests collide.
Tha Supreme Court, for example, must determine this term whether the press may
publish the contents of a private telephone call obtained by means of an unlawful
wiretap. EPIC, my own organization, dedicated to both the protection of privacy and
the promotion of free speech, struggled with the question on which side we would
file an amicus. In the end, we decided it was too difficult a case. But recognizing
that there are, in some instances, difficult case does not mean as a gen~ral matter
that it is not possible to protect privacy and to promote free expression.
7. Federal Privacy Legislation Typically Does Not Preempt State Law
The issue of federal preemption is arising increasingly in discussions about privacy protection. It is important to understand that as a general matter, federal privacy law operates as a baseline and does not preempt stronger state statutes. This
is clear from laws such the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 and the subscriber
privacy provision in the Cable Act of 1984. This approach was reaffirmed recently
m the privacy provisions of the Financial Modernization Act of 2000 and the HIPAA
regulations.
There are important reasons in our form of ~overnment to continue to allow the
states to operate as "laboratories of democracy. Congress may fail to act or it may
act in such a way that "reduces or limits the protections that a state might otherwise
choose to provide for its citizens. States may also innovate and explore different approaches to common problems. California, for example, has recently passed legislation to address emergin~ privacy concerns and Maryland is now looki.ng at new legislation that would prOVIde importa~t new protections,
8. Public Support for Privacy Protection is a Significant Consideration in the Legislative Process
In understanding the protection of privacy in America it is critical to keep in mind
the central role that the Congress and the state legislatures have played in safeguarding privacy. In some instances, it has been the courts that have established
rights of privacy, but more often it has been the legislature that has set out by
means of statute the rights and responsibilities associated with the use of personal
information in the commercial realm.
My belief is that there is today widespread public support to establish Fair InformatIon Practices for the collection and use of personal information in the commercial sector. There is a strong American tradition to protect privacy in law, many legislative precedents and broad based public support. The question is whether Congress will accept the challenge and act to safeguard this right, described by Justice
Brandeis "as the most comprehensive of all rights and the one most cherished by
a free people,"
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and will be
pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. STEARNS. Professor Feldblum?
STATEMENT OF CHAI R. FELDBLUM

Ms. FELDBLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee.
My name is Chai Feldblum. I am a law professor at Georgetown
University Law Center and director of the Federal Legislation Clinic, where we have worked on the issue of medical privacy for a
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number of years for various organizations. But I am testifying here
today in my personal capacity as a law professor-although I am
used to answering questions and being grilled by students. f don't
know; r guess the new ~eneration of students is quite differentto talk about my expenences in employment discrimination and
medical privacy. And instead of talking about the minute details of
those areas, of which there are many, instead of getting bogged
down in that to sort of step back and talk about conceptually why
it makes sense for government to regulate in these areas.
Now, my written testimony gives you a description of the privacy
requirements of the ADA, and I am not going to repeat those here.
Basically, employers cannot ask questions of employees about their
medical conditions at certain stages of the application process.
They can collect a whole range of medical information before actually hiring somebody. That medical information has to be kept confidential, and employees with medical conditions are forced to disclose those conditions to their employers if they want reasonable
accommodations.
So what I want to focus on is why is government regulation of
privacy in this way appropriate? I think that when government
regulates conduct that it is otherwise permitted to regulate, such
as employment discrimination, it can also regulate speech that
would lead directly to such discrimination. So, for example, government can say you can't refuse to hire someone because she is pregnant. You also can't refuse to ask someone if she is going to become
pregnant.
Similarly, you can't ask applicants about their medical conditions
if that means they won't get a fair chance to be considered for a
job, but you can certainly find out about their medical information
if that means they are not going to be qualified. None of us want
to have 911 operators unable to hear. I mean, that is not the point.
Now, in the area of medical privacy, the context that we are dealing with is that patients believe that they have a confidential relationship with their medical professional, and yet, that expectation
is compromised every day by the interconnected research, medical,
treatment, payment, quality system that we live in. The California
Health Care Foundation has done a fascinating presentation of
where our medical information actually goes, and I would absolutely recommend that presentation to everybody.
Now, of course, a certain amount of individually identifiable
health care information has to flow through our medical system. AB
someone who has represented disability organizations, I can tell
you that people with disabilities have a very pragmatic view of this
issue. Bottom line: they want a health care system that is effective
and efficient. But precisely because the interaction in the medical
system starts with a contractual relationship between the patient
and th~ provider, the individual must feel assured of certain
ground rules that their information will, in fact, be used appropriately.
Now, let me end by saying that Congress, in 1996, did tell the
Department of Health and Human Services to implement nine
standards, and these were standards about transaction codes and
identifiers and data security, et cetera. I think it made sense for
Congress to interact in this way with the private parties because
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the only way to have consistent, uniform standards in the health
care system is if, in fact, government intervenes and says everyone
has to abide by these standards. That is what eight of those standards were about.
But at the same time, government has to make sure that privacy
protections are built in as well. That is the ninth standard.
Well, I very much appreciate that you are looking at this issue,
and I look forward to answering any of your questions.
Mr. STEARNS. You roughly have 2 minutes left.
Ms. F'ELDBLUM. Oh, I do. My thing over here says ston.
•
Mr. STEARNS. I just checked.
Ms. FELDBLUM. Well, then, I am going to give you my last two
paragraphs.
Mr. STEARNS. There you go.
Ms. FELDBLUM. And I know that if you had gone home without
them, it just would not have been the same.
I know that there is controversy about the regulations that have
been put out, but for purposes of this big picture hec..:ring, I want
to stress the need to analyze privacy within the specific context of
which the perceived need to regulate arises, and if there is anything that you get from this hearing and to me anything about
doing-thank you; I know you agree, a big pidure hearing as opposed to a hearing on a particular bill, it is to lOcus on the context
in which that privacy concern arises.
In the health care arena, that context is a longstanding belief between patient and doctor that medical information should be kept
confidential juxtaposed with the reality of a complex health care
treatment, payment, research, quality and marketing system that
uses a significant amount of individually identifiable information
without patients' explicit consent although with some patients'
dimly sensed fear.
The role of government, I believe, is to bring clarity and confidence to this area. Thus, the goal of any system of privacy regulation should be to enhance the treatment, payment, research and
quality aspects of our health care system through creating a workable privacy system that gives patients trust and ensure that
health care entities can engage in the marketing necessary to their
finandal health consistent with consumer consent.
Now, I can assure you as someone who has worked in this area
for 6 years that there is a lot of debate and a lot of detail within
that sentence. What is a workable system? But I think there is a
common principle that there is a role for government to ensure that
there are uniform, consistent standards and confidence and trust in
the system. That is what you shf'" Id do in the medical privacy
area, and consistent with the contl t of these other areas, that is
what you should do in other areas as well.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chai R. Feldblum follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAl R. FELDBLUM. PROFESSOR OF
UNIVERSITY LAw CENTER

LAw, GEOR(;t;TOWN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection:
Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding "Privacy in the Commercial
World." My name is Chai Feldblum. I am a Professor of Law at Georgetown Univer-
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sity Law Center, and Director of the Law Center's Federal Legislation Clinic. I created the Clinic in 1993 with the goal of training law students to be "legislative lawyers"; that is, lawyers who are equally at ease with law and with politics. My goal
18 to train lawyers who are steeped in law and who like reading legal text, and at
the same time, who are sophisticated about politics, know how to speak and write
in "English" rather than in "law," and who like the particular world of political negotiation. The goal is to produce lawyers who will actually be helpful to you and
your staff as YOll create lepslation to address the needs of our country. I
I also wear the traditional hat of an academic professor. My academic le/;al
writings have been primarily in the area of civil rights, with a focus on disability
law and sexual orientation and the law.
I appear before you today as an amalgam of those roles. In my life before teaching, I was the principal lawyer representing the disability community in the drafting and negotiating of the Americans with Disabilities Act-including those provisions impacting on privacy and confidentiality. As Director of the Federal Legislation Clinic, I have represented the National Association of People with AIDS
(NAPWA), in its capacity as co-chair of the Privacy Working Group of the Consortium of Citizens with Dlsabilities. 2 For six years, we have worked on behalf of the
disability community toward ~passage of comprehensive federal medical privacy legislation. More recently, the Clinic has represented the Family Violence Prevention
Fund which is also concerned with enhancing medical privacy in this country.3
T;;day, however, I wish to draw on those f'xperiences to share with you some general observations about protecting the privacy of our nation's citizens. 4 I am less familiar with the academic and advocacy debate regarding proposals to regulate consumer information databanks developed by businesses (the subject of some of the
writing of my co-panelists), and more familiar with the debate regarding privacy as
it relates to employment discrimination and medical information. What I hope to do,
therefore, is share with you some observations on the latter forms of privacy, and
perhaps extrapolate from that some observations on privacy in general. s
A useful place to start is a sentence from my co-panelist Eugene Volokh's May
2000 article on freedom of speech and information privacy: '''[Plrivacy' is a word
with many meanings, and WIth such words both judges and laypeople often shift
(rom one meaning to the other even in cases where the meanings have little in comuon." 6 I completely agree with that observation. While I do not necessarily agree
with my co-panelist's subsequent conclusion that harmful analngies are more likely
be drawn if the privacy of consumer information databases are regulated,7 I believe
) For an explication of "Ie~slative lawyering," see "Five Cir.' 5 of an Effective Coalition" and
"What is Legislative LawyenngT available at http://www.law'b ,rgetown.edulclinicsfflc.
2 The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) is a Washington-based coalition of approximately 100 national disability, consumer, advocacy, provider and professional or~anizations
that advocate on behalf of 54 million children and adults with disabilities and their families.
As advocates for persons with disabilitiesJ CCD supports strong privacy protections that give
health consumers confidence that their inrormation will be used appropriately and that permit
the continued viability of medical research and delivery of <l,uaJity health care.
l The Family Violence Prevention Fund is a leading national organization that advocates on
behalf of the millions of women and children who are the victims of domestic violence each year.
The Fund runs several major programs that deal specifically with health care and domestic violence. As advocates for people affected by uomestic violence, the Fund supports privacy protections that will give victims confidence that their personal information will be used appropria,<lly.
"'Thus I appear before you toriay ir. my personal capacity.
~ My observations with regard to empl')yment jiscrimination and medical privacy should flOt
be taken to mean that I do not believe there are also serious policr considerations for applying
privacy regulation t~ consumer databases of non-medical informatIOn. Indeed, while I consider
the work of my colleague, Eugene Volokh, see below, to be of superb quality, I believe Congress
must be cautious in chilling in its own actio., in anticipation of some speculative long·term constitutional concern. While ] have touted the advantages of Congress drafting a narrowly circumscribed bill to address a real, documented public policy evil to be remedied, so as to avoid
cr('ating an inviting target fJr the Supreme Court to further narrow Congressional power, see
te !imony of Chai R. Feldblum before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Religious Liberty
Prutection \l·t, September 9, 1999, I have never believed that Congress shou:d fail to act when
there is a clearly defined public policy problem and the recommended legislative response is not
clearly unconstitutional. Oi course, as Congress acts, it is useful to have the background analysis of scholar" such as my co-panelists who may entertain some doubts about such actions.
6Eugene Volokh, FrI!edom of Speech and Information Priuacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1102 (2000) (hereinafter
Freedom of Speech).
7Volokh argues that "once restrictions on people's speech are accepted in the name of 'privacy,'
people will likely use them to argue for other restrictbns on 'privacy' grounds, even when the
matter involves a very different sort of 'plivacy.'" Id. fit 1102. By contrast, my colleague at
Georgetown Universit! Law Center, Julie Cohen, has written some interesting pieces presenting
a different point of V1ew. See Julie E. C~hen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
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he has helped enhance the practical debate about privacy by illuminating its various
meanings and componente. 8 What I would like to do is focus on two areas where
the concerns are somewhat different, I believe, than those that arise in the context
of conSUfiler information databases. The best way for Members of Congress to carry
out the hard work of figuring out what legislation to pass (and how to craft such
legislation) depends, I believe, on developing a sensitive understanding of the context in which various privacy concerns arise.
Th! two areas on which I would like to focus are employment discrimination and
medical privacy. Again, I do not plan to focus on the minute details (\f these areas
(and there are a number of very minute details in each of these areas, 1 assure you),
but rather, on the broad conceptual reasons for the enactment of legislation in these
areas. Indeed, in both employment discrimination and medical privacy, Congress
has already acted to some extent-and there are lessons to be drawn from those enactments.
During pa88age of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Congress chose to
draw oit Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a law that prohibits programs
that receive federal funds from discriminating on the basis of disability. That law,
and the regulations issued pursuant to the law, provided Congress with a 17-year
track record of substantive non-discrimination principles on the basis of disability.
Section 504 was not focused on privacy, and yet the law included some important
privacy components that were carried over to the ADA.
Congress recognized that people with hidden disabilities (such as breast cancer or
HIV infection or diabetes) often do not get the chance to be fairly considered for a
job because the employer finds out-through questioning at an interview or through
a medical eX'lmination or questionnaire-that the applicant has a particular medical
condition. In ijuch cases, the employer may choose not to hire the person because
of unsubstantiated fear~ regarding the person's possible absentee rate or the response of co-worlr'!rs, or because of possibly substantiated fears of higher health care
costs that might be associated with that individual. In either case, in such circumstances the individual is judged not on the merits of his or her ability to do the
j®, but rather on ramifications that (justly or unjustly) flow from the individual's
medical condition.
In some cases, of course, an individual's medical condition will impact directly on
the person's ability to penorm the job. For example, we all want our airline pilots
to be able to see, our truck drivers to be able to drive, and out "911 operators" to
be able to hear.
The ADA thus creates privacy rules that ensure applicants are provided a fair
chance to lie considered for a job, but also ensures that employers are permitted to
hire only qualifred employees. Under this framework, employers may not ask job applicants to disclose their medical conditions during the initial stages of an application process. Rather, after a conditional job offer is extended, employers may ask
applicants to respond to questions about their medical conditions (or to take a physical examination}-and based on that information, employers may refuse to hire employees who are not qualified for the relevant jobs.9
Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Tech·
nology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L. J. xx (2001Xforthcoming). See also Janlori Goldman, Privacy & Individual EmpowerrMnt in the Interactive ARe, V1S10NS OF PRIVACY: POLICY
CH01CES FOR TflE DJG1TAL AOE <C. Bennett & R. Grant eds. 1999).
8The work of my other co-panelists has also been of significant use in this regard. See, -e.g.,
Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 Fordham
Intel1. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 97 (2000) (hereinafter Privacy); Fred If. Cate, The Changing
Face of Privacy Protection in the Euroran Union and the United States, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 173
(1999); Wayne Madsen, David L. Sobe , Marc Rotenberg, David Banisar of The Electronic Privacy Information Center, Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey Of Encryption Pol·
icy, 16 J. M8.l'8hall J. Computer & Info. L. 475 (1998).
942 U.S.C. § 12112(a)..(c). The ADA had originally incorporated a stricter rule which permitted
employers to request from applicants only that medical Information which was directly related
to the job. After negotiations with the business community and the Bush Administration, however, that provision was modified to allow el'lpJoyers to request any medical information. Chni
Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A
View from the Inside, 64 TEMPLE LAw REvIEW 521, 535-537 (1991) (hereinafter Medical Exami·
nations). The key protection for people with disabilities, however, is that the medical information must demonstrate they are not qualified for the job. Whether a person is qualified for a
job wil1 depend on whether there are reasonable accommodations that will enable the person
to perform the job functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5Xa); see generally, Chai Feldblum, Antidisaimination Requirements of the ADA. IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
RloHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMEIlICANS (L. Gostin & H. Beyer eds. 1992).
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Once employers have collected medical information about applicants through such
<J,uestioning or examinations, that information must be kept confidential. iO In addition, if an employer seeks medical information from an employee on the job/.Il that
information similarly must be kept confidential. What that means is the fOllowing.
If medical information indicates that an applicant is not qualified to Jlerform a job,
or that an employee is no longer qualified to perform the job, the merucal information may be used to refuse to hire or to fire that applicant or employee. This includes, obviously, disclosing the medical information to the relevant person with employment authority. However, if the medical information does not mdicate that an
applicant or employee is unqualified for a job, then that information cannot be circulated within the employment setting,12
Ther:l is a flip side to the confidentiality requirements of the ADA. Many people
with medical conditions wish to keep their conditions private, and do not wish either
their employer or their co-workers to know of their conditions. Often, this does not
pose a problem. However in certain circumstances, an employee is required by law
to divulge his or her condition, even if such disclosure is personally difficult for the
individual. These circumstances arise when an employee seeks a modification of an
employment practice or procedure (a "reasonable accommodation") because of his or
her medical condition. Thus, for example, if an employee has a health condition that
rllquires her to receive a two-hour treatment once a week, and she seeks time off
to receive that treatment-she must disclose the existence and nature of her health
condition in order to receive the benefit of the reasonable accommodation requirement under the ADA.1l
What can we extrapolate from these employment requirements? As I noted, it is
important to view pnvacy issues in the context in which they arise. When government regulates conduct that it is otherwise permitted to regulate (for example, prohibiting discrimination in employment contracts based on race, sex, or disability),
I believe it is also pennitted to regulate speech that would directly contribute to
such discrimination. Thus, the government may not only prohibit an employer from
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, but may also prohibit an employer from
asking a prospective job applicant if she is planning to become pregnant. 14 Similarly, employers may be restricted in the questions they ask of applicants regarding
their medical conditions during the application process. 1S These restrictions should
be narrowly tailored, however, to the harm sought to be prevented by the government. For example, such tailorin~ is evident in the structure of the ADA, which permits employers to seek medical lnformation prior to actually hiring an individual.
The context of the employment relationship also justifies the fact that government
compels certain speech on the part of some employees with disabilities. As a ~eneral
matter, of course, government may not compel speech on the part of its citlzens. 16
But if an individual enters a contractual relationship with an employer, in which
certain facets of that relationship are regulated by the government, then that individual can be expected to conform to expectations in the relationship that have been
established through the government regulation. Thus, for example, although an individual must forgo some privacy rights if she wishes to take advantage of the rea10 42 U.S.C. § 12112(cX3XB).
After an employee is on-the-job, medical inquiries may only be made if they are job-related.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(cX4XA); Feldblum, Medical Examinations, at 538-540.
12The only individuals who may (1ain access to thE-se records are: supervisors who may be infonned regarding necessary restrict10ns or reasonable accommodations; first aid and safety- personnel, when appropriate. and government officials investigating compliance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(cX3)(B). According to regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, employers may also provide such informat1On to worker's compensation offices upon the
ftIing of a claim by an employee. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F R. § 1630.14(b).
13 EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.
14 See EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (983); King v. 1WA, 738 F.2d
255 (8th Cir. 1984).
1$ I do not believe there is much disagreement that speech which effectively constitutes an act
of discrimination is within government's legitin'ate power. For example, government may not
only prohibit employment discrimination based 0.1 race, but may also prohibit an employer from
runmng an ad that seeks "whites only" for a jo:). The more comp'licated question IS whether,
consistent with the First Amendment, govemmer,t may also prohibit employers from engaging
in speech that might lead directly to such discrimination. As noted, I believe government may
legitimately do 80. In some cases, however. the C( ntext in which this speech arises may well
be determinative. For example, in U.D. Registry, Inc v. Ca.lifornia, 40 Cal.Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct. App.
1995), a state court held that the j'overnment could not prohibit only CredIt reporting agencies
from disclosing information regarding certain housir.g action8, which were otherwise a matter
of public record. While I have 80me questions regarol'lg the outcome of this case, the fact that
the relevant information already existed in the public Qomain was critical to the court's decision.
16See WookY v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Webt Virginia State Board of Education f.I.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
.
II
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sonable accommodation ~uirement of the ADA. that trade seems both appropriate
and within the government s power.
A contractual relationship also exists in the area of medical privacy more generally. That relationship has led somE' commentators, who are otherwise leery of
governmental regulation of privacy. to view medical privacy in a different light. Let
me take two of my co-panelists as an example. Eugene Volokh has observed that
"one sort of limited information privacy law-contract law applied to promis~s not
to reveal information-is eminently defensible under free speech doctrine." 17 Volokh
notes that this protection should also cover implied contracts and explains the relevanee of trus for the medical context:
This explains much of why it's proper for the government to impose confidentiality requirements on lawyers. doctors. psychotherapists. and others: When
these professionals say "I'll be your advisor." they are Implicitly promising that
they'll be confidential advisors. as least so long as they do not explicitly disclaim
any such implicit promise. IS
A similar observation is made by Sin~leton in her critique of analyzing privacy
primarily as a "riftht to 'control' informatIOn about oneself." i9 As Sin~leton observes:
This idea is l'amiliar in medical and legal ethics and perhaps In other special
professional relationships. In these relationships the expectations makes sense.
The legal and medical professions understand that clients and patients will not
c·_nfide in them without the ri~ht of confidentiality. Even if this right did not
exist by statute, it is implicit m the agreements under which a doctor treats
his patients or the lawyer counsels his clients. This understanding is informed
by decades or even centuries of custom.20
The reality, of course. is that the confidential relationship patients believe they
have with their medical professionals is compromised every day by the reality of the
interconnected medical, research. payment. and marketing system that we live in.
The California HealthCare Foundation has developed a fascinating presentation
that graphically displays the flow of our medical information in our existing interconnected s;ystems. 21 Thus. for example, during and folIowing one visit to a hospital,
a patient's mdividually-identifiable health information may be sent to a lab. a pharmacy, a pharmacy wholesaler, a drug company, a marketer. an imaging center, a
primary care group administrator, a third party administrator, an insurance company, a research institution, a public health department, a medical information bureau, a life insurer. a state insurance board, an oversight or accreditation board,
and an employer.
Of course, a certain amount of individually-identifiable health information must
flow freely in our health care system in order for the system to work efficiently, effectively, and at a high level of quality. As someone who has represented disability
organizations over the years, I can assure you that people with disabilities have a
very pragmatic view of this issue. People with medical conditions tend to interact
a Significant amount with the medical system. Hence, they want an effective, efficient, and hi~h quality health care system, together with the best that increased research and disease management can offer.
But disability rights advocates do not experience their desire for medical privacy
to be in conflict with their desire for an effective health care system, and thus they
do not view these interests as needing to be ''balanced'' against each other. Rather,
precisely because the interaction wit,h the medical system is, at first onset, a contractual relationship-the interaction works best if llatients feels assured of certain
ground-rules: that their individual medical informatIOn will not be disclosed to entities that may use that information to harm them; that their information will be
used, within the health care system, in an "appropriate manner;" 22 that they will
17Volokh, Freedom of Speech, at 1057.
18 Id. at 1058.
I. Singleton, Privacy, at 122,
2°Id. at 122-123.
21 I watched this presentation at a conference sponsored by the California HealthCare Foundation in December 2000. It is one I would whole-hearndly recommend to Members of Congress
and their staff. A useful summary lP'aphic: of "sample data /low" was developed by the Georgetown University Health Privacy projeCt, based on the presentation of the California HealthCare
Foundation, and is attached to this testimony.
22 I put "appropriate" in quotation marks because the debate over health care privacy regula·
tion sometimes concerns the scope of the 9Ctivities over which patients should be able to control
transfer of their individually identifiable information. There are many activities that patients
may not realize, at first blush, are "appropriate" uses of their mediea1 infonnation, and yet, such
actIvities may be quite essential for the workings of the health care system. For this reason,
the debate often focuses on what providers and plans may legitimately demand-as a pre-condiContinued
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be frovided information about what those "appropriate" uses will be, and that they
wi! have the opportunity to review their own medical records. Thus, establishing
an effective system of privacy regulation can enhance the operation of the health
care system by increasmg individuals:: trust and confidence in the initial medical
contractual refationship.23
As in the area of emplorment discrimination Congress has already acted to some
extent in the area of medical privacy-although there is work that still needs to be
done. In 1996 Congress direCted the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to deveiop nine administrative simplification standards for use in the health
care system. These standards were to address: "transaction codes and medical data
code sets; consistent identi6ers for patients, providers, health plans, and employers,i
claims attachments that su,eport a request for payment; data security; enforcement
and "information privacy." 4 As the General Accounting Office described this Congressional mandate: "Taken tofether, the nine standards are intended to streamline
the flow of information integra to the operation of the health care system while protecting con6dential health information from inappropriate access, disclosure, and
use." 25
Congress' action to date in this area reflects, I believe, an appropriate interaction
between government and private contractual parties in the health care system.
Given the inteTl'onnectedness of our health care system, and the increasing use of
computer ttcw.~Jogy, all parties benefit if there are consistent and uniform standards that wi!1 be used by all parties to health care transactions. To create such uniformitr and consistency-and hence, administrative simplification-government
must mtervene through the establishment of standards to which all parties must
conform. However, as government facilitates the uniform entry of our medical information into this administratively simplified system, it must simultaneously ensure
that privacy standards, policies, and protections are built into the system as well.
Congress took that initial step in 1996, and the Department of Health and
Human Services fulfilled its obligation in 2000. While I, as others, are disconcerted
that the process will be reviewed yet again,26 I have no doubt that, as Secretary
of HHS Tommy G. Thompson has stated, after reviewin~ public comments, he intends to "put strong and effective health privacy protectIOns into effect as quickly
as possible."27 I believe the Secretary, as well as the heath care industry, clearly
recognize that effective privacy protection facilitates and enhances the doctor-patient relationship'
The reality, 0 course, is that Congress has not yet acted to ensure that medical
privacy protection will exist-as a reality-in all contexts in which problems of disclosure may arise. For example, the mandate Congress handed to HHS covered only
a select group of entities in the health care system (health care providers, health
plans, and health care clearinghouses), and did not cover a range of other entities
(such as emfloyers, educational institutions, and financial institutions) that also obtain medica information. While the regulation issued by HHS makes some effort
to address subsequent disclosures by such entities, I believe most observers con aider
there is room for improvement in this area.
The actions that Congress has previously taken in the area of medical privacy,
together with the work that remains to be accGlilplished, provides us with some general observations on the role of government in this arena. As I stated at the outset,
tion for treating a patient or paying for such treatment-as they enter the contractual relation·
ship with the patient.
23 A national survey released in January 1999 found that one in six Americans engages in
some form of "privacy protective behavior" because he or she is afraid of confidentiality breaches
regarding sensitive medical information. These activities include withholding information from
health care providers, providing inaccurate information, doctor-hopping to avoid a consolidated
medical record, paying out of pocket for care that is covered by insurance, and avoiding care
altogether. California Healthcare Foundation, National Survey: Con{ulentiality of Medical
Records (January 1999). The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates.
Results are available at http':llwww.chcf.org!conference!survey.crfm.
24 Ms. Leslie G. AronoVltz, Director, Health Care-Program Administrati.:m and Integrity
Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, February 8, 2001, at 2. The mandate on HHS to implement an information privacy standard was triggered onJy if Congress failed to enact comprehensive medical
privacy legislation by August 21, 1999. Of the nine standards required to be issued, HHS has
ISSUed a regulation governing ele<tronic transactions (on August 17, 2000) and a regulation governing information privacy (on De.=ember 28, 2000).
2'ld.
uSee Robert Pear, "Health Secretary Delays Medical Records Protections," NY Times, February 27, 2001 at A14 (reporting I.hat
Secretary Tommy G. Thomson announced he would
seek addition;! public comment 011 the privacy regulation i88ued by HHS in December 2000).
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"privacy" must be viewed within a specific context. In the health care arena, that
context is a long-standing belief between patient and doctor that medical information should be kept "confidential," juxta~ with the reality of a complex health
care treatment, payment, research quality and marketing system that uses a significant amount of individually identifiable health care information without patients' explicit knowledge (albeit presumed by some patients with some dimly sensed
fear). The role of government, I believe, is to bring clarity and confidence to this
area. The goal of auy system of privacy regulation must be to enhance the treatment, payment, research, and quality aspects of our health care system throul,h creating a workable privacy system that provides patients with trust in their health
care system, and at the same time, ensures that health care entities can en(;age in
the marketing necessary to their financial health in a manner consistent wi~h consumer consent.
Obviously, this is not necessarily an easy project. For example, while ~ doubt
many observers of the current health care pnvacy debate would quibble with the
first part of my previous sentence, I expect there would still be debate rfgarding
what is a "workable system" of privacy regulation, what requirements "enhance" research or simply make life more "convenient" for researchers, and whether one uniform federal standard, with fir) state variations, is an essential component of such
a system. Moreover, I am sure there would be disagreement regarding the extent
of marketing that should be permitted without consumer consent. Nevf'rtheless, I
believe there is a shared conceptual principle that it is legitimate for Jovernment
to intervene in this area so as to enhance patient trust in the health care system.
The fact that this may be a hard job for government to do has never !Jeen a reason
not to tackle it.
Let me conclude with some comments on an area that represeT lts one of those
"hard jobs" that need to be tackled-and that brings together sorhe of my observations on employment discrimination and medical privacy. We are hies sed to be living
in a century where amazing medical and scientific advances arl':. made every year.28
The success of the Human Genome Project is one example of such an astonishing
scientific breakthrough. But the researchers in that project, and in com{larable private sector projects, correctly warn us that "genetic testing" and "genetic markers"
must be treated with caution. The existence of a "genetic marker" does not necessarily mean an individual will develop a particular disease. 29 Moreover, employers
and insurance companies may begin to view genetic information as useful information to compile, and then act upon such information for p~ses that the general
public, and Congress, may well find objectionable. 30 The princlples that I articulated
above should, I believe, lead Congress to clearly prohibit unjustified discrimination
based on genetic markers for health conditions (as well as for the health conditions
themselves), and to ensure that any mt~dical privacy regulation clearly encompasses
protection for genetic information.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to responding to your questions.

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you.
Let me start with my question.,. Professor Volokh, this is perhaps
a more legal question, but I think our committee should tackle this
and get the nuances here. What legal considerations would creating
a property right in personal information trigger? \
Mr. VOLOKH. Sure; this is one of the arguments that is sometimes made in support of information privacy sreech restrictions,
that they just create a property right in persona information. The
Supreme Court has said that certain kinds of speech restrictionsspecifically, copyright law is the best example-are justifiable on
28 Of course, the existence of such breakthroughs only makes the reality of "medical mysteries"
that much more heartbreaking. See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, SECOND OPINION: STORIES OF INTUITION AND CHOICE IN THE CHANGING WORLD OF MEDIC1NE (2000); Jeff Wheelwright, THE IRRITABLE HEART: THE MEDICAL MYSTERY OF THE GULF WAR (2001); Hillary Johnsen, OSLER'S WEB:
JNSIDE THE LABYRINTH OF THE CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME EPIDEMIC (1996). Nevertheless,
medical advances continue to help a large number of individuals.
29For back~ound information on th~ Human Genome Proiect and genetic research generally,
see the webSite of the National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes
of Health, available at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov.
3()Certain evidence seems to indicate that such activities are already taking place. See, e.g.,
U.S. Equal Employment OpportunitJ' Commission, "EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under Americans
with Disabilities Act," available at http://www.eeoc.gov/pressl2-9·01-c.html.

